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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a model of distribution to analyze the effects of neoliberal globalization 
on labor in the developing countries. Distribution is determined via wage bargaining by 
workers, price setting by firms, and improvements in productivity. The full model has the 
nature of a Post-Keynesian conflicting claims model for an open economy under the pressure 
of globalization. The conflict inflation is extended to an open economy case with imported 
inputs, where the pass through effect of the depreciation of the local currency also becomes 
important. The variables that reflect the macroeconomic effects of globalization are modeled 
as parameters that affect the bargaining power of labor on two levels: the first group is related 
with the interaction with the global economy, i.e. international trade, and FDI. The second is 
about the domestic fiscal and monetary policy variables, which are particularly related to the 
specific form that globalization takes in the era of neoliberalism, i.e. government 
expenditures, and the interest rate. Then the model is solved for distribution of income, i.e. the 
wage share, thus a reduced form of the model is obtained, which is estimated in a companion 
paper to test whether the change in the international and domestic macroeconomic 
environment has affected the decline the labor’s share. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper develops a model of distribution to analyze the effects of neoliberal globalization 
on labor in the developing countries. Distribution is determined via wage bargaining by 
workers, price setting by firms, and improvements in productivity. The full model has the 
nature of a Post-Keynesian conflicting claims model for an open economy under the pressure 
of globalization. The conflict inflation is extended to an open economy case with imported 
inputs, where the pass through effect of the depreciation of the local currency also becomes 
important. The variables that reflect the macroeconomic effects of globalization are modeled 
as parameters that affect the bargaining power of labor on two levels: the first group is related 
with the interaction with the global economy, i.e. international trade, and FDI. The second is 
about the domestic fiscal and monetary policy variables, which are particularly related to the 
specific form that globalization takes in the era of neoliberalism, i.e. government 
expenditures, and the interest rate. Then the model is solved for distribution of income, i.e. the 
wage share, thus a reduced form of the model is obtained, which is estimated in a companion 
paper (Onaran, 2004) to test whether the change in the international and domestic 
macroeconomic environment has affected the decline the labor’s share. 
 
The stylized facts of the developing economies point out that the demand effects and the 
bargaining effects of neoliberal globalization generate a decline in labor’s share. The decline 
in labor’s share on the other hand further enhances the aggregate demand deficiency, creating 
the main conflict of neoliberal regime of accumulation. Although there is a wide literature 
with a range of controversial positions about the effects of liberalization on the 
macroeconomic performance of the economies, less attention is paid to the different effects on 
distribution and employment. The seminal works by Lee and Jayadev (2005), Harrison 
(2002), Diwan (2001), Rodrik (1998), Fallon and Lucas (2002), Boratav et. al. (1996), Crotty 
and Dymski, (2000), Crotty and Lee (2002, 2004), Pollin (2002), which either present an in 
depth analysis of the effect of neoliberalism on labor, or discuss cross-country empirical 
evidence about labor’s share are the exceptions in this field, according to the best of our 
knowledge at the time when this work was prepared. These studies are also different from the 
mainstream studies that focus on individual income, and the effects of liberalization on 
growth, poverty and inequality (e.g. Dollar and Kraay, 2001; Barro, 1999).    
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a basic model of distribution. 
Section 3 introduces the variables that reflect the effect of neoliberal globalization on 
distribution.  
 
2. A Wage Bargaining Model 
 
In this section, we present a model for the distribution of the value added produced. 
Distribution is jointly determined via wage bargaining by workers, price setting by firms, and 
improvements in productivity. The full model has the nature of a Post-Keynesian conflicting 
claims model for an open economy, where globalization increases the distributional conflicts. 
The conflict inflation is extended to an open economy case with imported inputs, where the 
pass through effect of the depreciation of the local currency also becomes important.  
 
The workers bargain for a nominal wage per worker, W, with a targeted purchasing power, 
given the expected price level, Pe, and a targeted sha re out of value added, given the expected 
productivity, PRODe. The bargained share of labor in value added, WSB, is a function of the 
bargaining power of workers, which in turn depends on the labor market conditions, as well as 
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the macroeconomic environment. The labor market conditions are reflected via the rate of 
employment, E/N, i.e. employment/labor force, which can be consistent with a Marxian 
reserve army model, as well as a typical wage bargaining equation in a NAIRU model. The 
macroeconomic variables that are concerned in this study are the variables that reflect the 
change in the terms of bargaining due to globalization and the hegemony of neoliberal 
policies, for a given level of economic activity. For convenience of presentation, as of now we 
define a vector of macroeconomic variables, macro, and discuss the details of these variables, 
once the basic reduced form of wage share is derived. So, WSB can be written as follows: 
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All coefficients are positive numbers. Taking the logarithm and rearranging the terms logW, 
i.e. w, can be written as follows, where all the lower case letters indicate the logarithm of the 
respective variable: 
 
e
t
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e is determined via a simple general labor demand function, where employment is a positive 
function of output, y, and a negative function of the actual unit labor cost, which is also the 
actual share of labor in value added, ws, and there is a certain hysteresis effect from lagged 
employment. The model is built in the most general form; whether the labor costs have a 
significant effect on employment or not will effect the parameter estimations in the reduced 
form. 
 
13210 -+-+= tttt eawsayaae   (3) 
 
Substituting the same labor demand function for lagged employment, and redefinig the 
coefficients, we obtain1: 
 
1431210 -- --++= ttttt wsewseyeyeee  (3a) 
 
The expectations about price and productivity are determined via imperfect foresight, and 
adaptive expectations: 
 
tt
e
t ppp ×+×= - ba 1   (4) 
 
and  
 
tt
e
t prodprodprod ×+×= - ws 1  (5) 
 
The coefficients, a, ß, s, ?, are all less than one, and reflect indeed not only the formation of 
the expectations, but also the bargaining power of the workers to reflect price and productivity 
                                                 
1 In this case there would be a lagged effect from the second lag of employment, but we suppress this effect for 
convenience. 
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changes to wages. Particularly, if a+ß<1, and s+?<1, then in addition to a perfect foresight 
problem, wages are only imperfectly indexed to inflation and productivity.    
 
The actual wage share (in logarithms), on the other hand, is by definition bargained wage 
minus actual price minus actual productivity (all in logarithms): 
 
tttt prodpwws --=  (6) 
 
Substituting 3a into 2 to obtain 2a, and then 2a, 4, and 5 in 6, we get: 
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Accordingly, wage share is a positive function of y, a negative function of the unexpected 
change in the price level, thus the difference between the current price level, weighted by the 
parameter of estimation error (1-ß), and the past price level,  weighted by its effect on 
expected price. This effect reflects the conflict inflation effect. Similarly, the wage share is a 
negative function of the unexpected productivity change. This may also be reflecting the 
imperfect indexation of wages to productivity changes, such that productivity increases are 
leading to increases in the profit share. 
 
Next we define the pricing behavior of the firms. Prices are set as a mark-up over variable 
costs. Variable costs include the cost of production workers, and domestic and imported 
inputs. For simplicity, we abstract from domestic input costs. Then price (in logarithms) is 
equal to a mark-up rate, m, determined by the oligopolistic power of the firms, plus the unit 
labor cost, i.e. wage share, and a pass through effect from the current and past value of the 
exchange rate, x, which in turn depends on the degree of import dependence as well as the 
mark-up power of the firms (which jointly are reflected in the coefficients i1 and i2 below):  
 
121 -+++= tttt xixiwsmp  (8) 
 
Productivity is on the other hand by definition: 
ttt eyprod -=  (9) 
 
So far we have talked about simply the share of productive workers in value added, and their 
productivity. However, in empirical analysis we will observe the wage share of the total work 
force in value added. Thus a modification in the wage share (6) is required, such that it is 
defined as the wage bill of fixed and variable (productive) workers as a ratio to value added. 
Thus the actual wage share, ws (in logarithms again) is wage minus price minus the 
productivity of the total workers.  
 
tttt prodtotpwws --=   6a 
 
The productivity of the total workers is on the other hand is equal to the logarithm of the ratio 
of output to the sum of the number of fixed workers (FE) and productive workers (E): 
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The last term in the above equation is the ratio of productive workers to total employment, 
which is an increasing function of output. Thus prodtot can be rewritten as: 
 
ttt eyprodtot -+= )1( d  (9b)  
 
Substituting 3a into 9b to obtain 9c, and then 8, and 9c into 7, we get the reduced form 
equation for the wage share: 
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and the second lags of y, ws and x are dropped for convenience during the estimation process, 
related to the shortness of the time series data. f  is always a positive coefficient. 
 
The effect of production on the wage share will depend on the relative magnitudes of the 
positive bargaining effect via labor demand, and the negative effect via an unexpected 
increase in productivity, or the increase, which was not reflected to bargaining process. Thus 
the wage share can have a counter or pro-cyclical pattern, depending on these effects. 
Moreover, the parameters can also change during the business cycle, between expansion vs. 
recession years, making the cyclical behavior more complicated, as will be discussed in the 
empirical part. The effect of lagged growth on the wage share, on the other hand, depends on 
the positive bargaining effect via lagged labor demand effect, and the lagged productivity 
effect, which is expected to be mostly positive, since the output effect is supposed to dominate 
the employment effect of higher output on productivity. Even in cases when the latter is 
negative, this negative effect will rarely be big enough to offset the positive bargaining effect 
via labor demand.  
 
The effect of the lag of the wage share will depend on the relative magnitude of the negative 
bargaining effect via decreased labor demand effect in the previous period, the negative effect 
via productivity increase in the current period, and the positive effect from past inflation, and 
past productivity, to the extent they are reflected into the bargaining process. Additionally, 
from an empirical point of view, the lagged wage share also reflects the persistence of the 
distribution, and the speed of adjustment.  
 
Finally, the current value of the exchange rate is expected to have a negative effect on the 
wage share through its effect on current inflation, particularly significant when the imported 
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inputs have a high share in variable costs, and the firms are able to reflect import price 
changes to consumers.  The coefficient of the lag of the exchange rate will be ambiguous 
depending on the relative magnitude of the negative effect through its effect on current price, 
and the positive effect through the indexation of wages to past inflation. This can also be 
jointly interpreted, in the sense that, what leads to a decline in the wage share is unexpected 
depreciation, i.e. the change in depreciation, which generates unexpected inflation. 
 
Leaving aside the macroeconomic variables, this reduced form of the model for the wage 
share forms the basic model estimated in a companion study (Onaran, 2004). The reduced 
form is particularly useful for technical problems related to endogeneity in the case of price 
and employment. Besides, in the case of employment, there is the additional problem of the 
shortness of the time series data. Therefore the effect of inflation and unemployment on labor 
share will only take place implicitly in the estimations. 
 
At the estimation stage we specify the model in difference form. This makes sense intuitively, 
i.e. the change in the wage share is defined as a function of growth (current and lagged), 
nominal depreciation rate of the currency (current and lagged), and its own lag. It also is 
technically reasonable, due to the existence of unit root not only in output and exchange rate, 
but also in the wage share. 
 
3. Distribution and Globalization  
 
The variables that reflect the macroeconomic effects of globalization are modeled as 
parameters that affect the bargaining power of labor, and intensify the conflicts in the struggle 
of distribution.  The variables that will reflect the possible effects of globalization are two 
folded: the first group is related with the interaction with the global economy, i.e. 
international trade, and FDI. The second is about the domestic fiscal and monetary policy 
variables, which are particularly related to the specific form that globalization takes in the era 
of neoliberalism, i.e. government expenditures, and the interest rate. Obviously the changes in 
these variables affect the effective demand, and consequently employment and the bargaining 
power of the workers. However, they also may have further effects on the bargaining position 
of the workers. The empirical estimation will test, whether these variables, for a given level of 
economic activity. Moreover, in the absence of good time series indicators for the institutional 
variables, which effect the bargaining power of workers, like unionization, collective 
bargaining coverage, organizational strength, etc., the trends in these variables also reflect the 
general erosion in the position of labor vis a vi capital through the deregulation in the labor 
market, while trade liberalization, tight fiscal and monetary policies, and labor market 
deregulation usually has been implemented as part of a structural adjustment package.  
 
The effect of international trade will be analysed separately with respect to exports and 
imports, different from the previous literature, which discuss the effect of the volume of trade. 
The mainstream orthodoxy is expecting a positive effect of an increase in the export intensity 
of production (export/output) on wages due to the increased labor intensity of production in 
developing countries with a comparative advantage in labor intensive industries. However, 
export oriented policies usually have been accompanied with a shift in the balance of power 
relations in favor of capital and the deregulation of the labor market, in order to alleviate the 
pressure of international competition over profits, and transfer the costs of adjustment to 
labor. Similarly increased import penetration into the economy can intensify the conflicts 
during the bargaining process, creating a downward pressure on wages. On the other hand, 
since these countries are highly import dependent, imported goods can simply be 
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complementary to labor, rather than being a substitute. Moreover, if the imported goods are 
not the substitutes of domestically produced goods, this effect will not be observed.  
 
In the case of FDI, the positive expectation is again that an increase in FDI will not only 
increase the demand for labor, but by the transfer of more productive technology and better 
working relations in the firms with foreign capital, an increase in the ratio of FDI to GDP will 
create positive effects on wages. Obviously, the nature of FDI, i.e. whether it is in the form of 
equity capital or new investment in machinery and equipment, matters in the realization of the 
expected positive spill over effects. However, it is well known that low labor costs are one of 
the major factors that attract FDI. In this situation the threat of capital flight in case of the 
reversal of this relative labor cost advantage may generate a significant downward pressure 
over wages as the share of FDI in GDP increases. Moreover, if the FDI is mostly in terms of 
stock market transactions, rather than a genuine interest in long term investment, then the 
increase in the pressure over the firm through the shareholder valuation can lead to further 
conflicts in the bargaining process. 
 
On the domestic side of the medallion, fiscal contraction as part of the neoliberal agenda 
creates further negative effects on wages, apart from its direct effects through reduced 
demand. First, a decline in the current expenditures of the government can be due to not only 
lower public employment, but also lower wage increases for the civil servants, which would 
have significant spill over effects to the public sector as well.  Second, fiscal tightening would 
mean a decline in social welfare state expenditures like education, health, pension, or 
unemployment insurance, which also goes along with privatization in these sectors, leading to 
a decline in non- labor income. The consequent rise in the costs of job loss would moderate the 
militancy of workers during the wage bargaining process. 
 
Financial liberalization, tight monetary policy and independent central banks, with anti-
inflation as the sole target has been the other important domestic policy result of neoliberal 
globalization. The increase in the real interest rate of lending has been the end result, which 
resulted in lower investment, more fragility and uncertainty as opposed to the expectation of 
more savings and more investment. The rise in the interest rate could also have further effects 
in addition to the demand effects, reflecting the rise of the rentier, and the domination of the 
shareholder over the firms in the era of financialization. This process is also expected to 
intensify the conflict in the bargaining process. However, the low quality of the interest rate 
data is well known due to reporting problems, or even the lack of the data for lending rates in 
some cases. As an alternative measure of financialization, the share of interest payments in 
government expenditures will be used. This variable will also additionally reflect the effect of 
financial liberalization and the rise of the interest rates on an international scale, and the 
intensification of the public debt problem, which result in the crowding out of social welfare 
state expenditures. Both variables of financialization and tight monetary policy effects have 
not been studied in the literature as of yet. 
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